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How Should We Aggregate
Competing Claims?*
Alex Voorhoeve
Many believe that we ought to save a large number from being permanently bed-
ridden rather than save one from death. Many also believe that we ought to save
one from death rather than a multitude from a very minor harm, no matter how
large this multitude. I argue that a principle I call Aggregate Relevant Claims sat-
isfactorily explains these judgments. I offer a rationale for this principle and de-
fend it against objections.
ISuppose that you are a morally motivated stranger who, using your own
resources, can help others at negligible cost to yourself. Consider the
following cases:
Case 1. You can either fully cure one young man’s terminal illness
ðthereby restoring him to good health for a normal life spanÞ or fully
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shorten their lives but which will leave them completely disabled ðtheyThis article was presented to the Association for Legal and Social Philosophy, Phi-
hy for All, the Society for Applied Philosophy, and at the Joint Session of the Aris-
an Society and the Mind Association. It was also presented at Cambridge; Exeter;
ow; Harvard; the London School of Economics, Mu¨nster; the National Institutes of
th; Princeton; Stanford; and University of California, Berkeley. I thank those present
eir responses. I am also grateful to Elizabeth Ashford, Luc Bovens, Richard Bradley,
ne Burri, Simon Cotton, Marc Fleurbaey, Robert Goodin, Christopher Heathwood,
Leyland, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, William MacAskill, Michael Martin, Joseph Ma-
e´ronique Munoz-Darde´, Michael Otsuka, Alan Patten, Philip Pettit, Daniel Ramo¨ller,
y S. Richardson, Peter Vallentyne, the editors of this journal, and two anonymous
ees for comments. Finally, I thank Princeton’s University Center for Human Values for
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will be mentally unimpaired but permanently bedridden, which for
them will entail a life just somewhat better than an early deathÞ.1
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Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 65Is there a number of people you can save from being com-
pletely disabled for which you ought to save them from this disabil-
ity instead of the one from death?
Case 2. You can either cure one youngman’s terminal illness or cure
some number of other young people of an illness which will cause a
very minor harm ðthey will be bedridden for a dayÞ. Those facing
this minor harm otherwise have good prospects.
Is there a number of people you can spare this very minor harm
for which you ought to spare them this harm instead of saving the
one from death?
y philosophers answer these questions with yes and no, respectively.2t is, they believe in both a limited form of aggregation ði.e., that you
ought to save a large number of people from complete disability rather
than one from premature deathÞ and a limited form of nonaggregation
ði.e., that there is a harm small enough such that no number of such very
minor harms to people who will in any case have good lives can outweigh
curing one young person’s terminal illnessÞ. Survey results suggest that a
substantial share of subjects agrees.3
1. I am here assuming that everyone with this condition has the well-being level that
le typically assign to it in surveys ðsee Erik Nord, Jose-Louis Pinto Prades, Jeff Rich-
n, Paul Menzel, and Peter Ubel, “Incorporating Societal Concerns for Fairness in
erical Valuations of Health Programmes,” Health Economics 8 ½1999: 25–39Þ. I am of
e not claiming that, in reality, all who are disabled in this way do or should regard their
nce as only somewhat better than an early death.
. See David Brink, “The Separateness of Persons, Distributive Norms, and Moral
ry,” in Value, Welfare, and Morality, ed. R. G. Frey and C. W. Morris ðCambridge: Cam-
e University Press, 1993Þ, 252–89, on 270; Frances Kamm,Morality, Mortality, 2 vols. ðOx-
Oxford University Press, 1993–Þ, vol. 1, chaps. 8–10, and Intricate Ethics ðOxford: Ox-
University Press, 2007Þ, 297–98 and 484–86; T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998Þ, 238–41; Roger Crisp, “Equality, Priority,
ompassion,” Ethics 113 ð2003Þ: 745–63, 754; Michael Otsuka, “Saving Lives, Moral The-
nd the Claims of Individuals,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 34 ð2006Þ: 110–35; Larry
in, “Health Care Distribution and the Problem of Trade-Offs,” in “Goodness” and “Fair-
Ethical Issues in Health Resource Allocation, ed. Daniel Wikler and Christopher Murray
eva:WorldHealthOrganization, forthcomingÞ; andDaleDorsey, “Headaches, Lives, and
,” Utilitas 21 ð2009Þ: 36–58. For criticism of the no answer to case 2, see Alastair Nor-
, “Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 26
Þ: 135–67; Derek Parfit, “Justifiability to Each Person,” Ratio 16 ð2003Þ: 368–90; and
Broome, “A Comment on Temkin’s Trade-Offs,” in Wikler and Murray, “Goodness” and
ess,” andWeighing Lives ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2004Þ, 56–58.
. See Frank Cowell, Marc Fleurbaey, and Bertil Tungodden, “The Tyranny Puzzle in
re Economics: An Empirical Investigation” ðSTICERDWorking Paper PEP-5, Suntory
oyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School
onomics and Political Science, 2010Þ.
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If these moral judgments are both correct, then this spells trouble
for familiar views in distributive ethics. On standard forms of utilitari-
66 Ethics October 2014anism and prioritarianism, curing one young person from a terminal ill-
ness has a fixed, positive, noninfinite moral value. So does sparing one
well-off person the harm of being bedridden for a day—albeit that the
latter value is much lower. Moreover, sparing N people from the latter
harm generates N times as much value as sparing one person this harm,
so that, on these theories, for some N, the moral value of saving N well-
off people from being bedridden for a day will exceed the moral value of
saving one young person’s life. These theories therefore cannot accom-
modate the judgment that there is no number of very minor harms to
those who will in any case have good lives that one ought to prevent in-
stead of saving one person’s life.4 Moreover, as Marc Fleurbaey, Bertil
Tungodden, and Peter Vallentyne have shown, standard forms of egali-
tarianism cannot accommodate these judgments in combination.5
I am interested in the question whether there is an appealing moral
view that explains the aforementioned pair of judgments. In this arti-
cle, I examine the following candidate, which I call Aggregate Relevant
Claims ðARCÞ.
ARC :godd
Off,”
51. Each individual whose well-being is at stake has a claim on you
to be helped. ðAn individual for whom nothing is at stake does
not have a claim.Þ
2. Individuals’ claims compete just in case they cannot be jointly sat-
isfied.
3. An individual’s claim is stronger :
aÞ the more her well-being would be increased by being aided;
and
bÞ the lower the level of well-being from which this increase
would take place.
4. A claim is relevant if and only if it is sufficiently strong relative
to the strongest competing claim.
5. You should choose an alternative that satisfies the greatest sum
of strength-weighted, relevant claims.ARC takes this relatively simple form in the limited class of cases I
ider. In these cases, you must decide whom to benefit by improvingcons
their well-being over what would otherwise happen due to natural causes.4. T. M. Scanlon, “Replies,” Ratio 16 ð2003Þ: 424–39, 433; Marc Fleurbaey, Bertil Tun-
en, and Peter Vallentyne, “On the Possibility of Nonaggregative Priority for the Worst
Social Philosophy and Policy 26 ð2009Þ: 258–85, 258.
. See Fleurbaey, Tungodden, and Vallentyne, “On the Possibility.”
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ðNo alternative involves making anyone worse off than they would have
been but for your intervention.Þ To make it plausible that the well-being
Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 67at stake is of concern, I focus on cases in which you can improve people’s
health-related well-being. I also assume that no one has claims based on
desert, that no one is responsible for her level of well-being, and that no
one has prior entitlements. In addition, my cases involve neither risk nor
changes in the population. Furthermore, the alternatives under consid-
eration give an individual either the best or the worst feasible outcome
for him. ðI therefore will not consider cases in which some alternatives
are of intermediate value for an individual.Þ Finally, claims to an alterna-
tive are either all relevant or all irrelevant.
In case 1, ARC yields the following conclusions. The youngman who
can be cured of a terminal illness has a very strong claim. This is because
so much is at stake for him and because he would be very badly off if he
were not aided. A person who can be cured of the complete disability
also has a strong claim because there is a great deal at stake for him, and
if he were not aided, he would have a life only just worth living. Since
both competing claims are so strong, they are relevant to each other. On
ARC, you therefore ought to save a large number of people from be-
coming completely disabled rather than save one from death.
In case 2, the claim of the young man is very strong for the afore-
mentioned reasons. By contrast, a person who can be cured of the very
minor ailment has only a very weak claim because so little is at stake for
her, and she would be well-off even if unaided. The latter’s claim is there-
fore irrelevant to the former. No number of claims to be rid of the very
minor harm can therefore jointly outcompete the young man’s claim to
be saved from death.
In sum, unlike standard theories of distributive ethics, ARC ac-
commodates both an attractive form of aggregation and a plausible limit
on aggregation.6 Some have therefore endorsed it or something akin to6. There are other nonstandard theories that can accommodate these two judgments
together. Perhaps the best known of these is a “threshold view,” on which there is an ab-
solute threshold of well-being, such that an improvement in well-being below the threshold,
no matter how small and no matter how few people would receive it, always outweighs an
improvement above the threshold, no matter how large and no matter how many people
would receive it. When all improvements take place below the threshold, then the numbers
count, as do their size and the level from which they take place. The same applies above the
threshold ðsee Bertil Tungodden, “The Value of Equality,” Economics and Philosophy 19 ½2003:
1–44; Campbell Brown, “Priority or Sufficiency . . . or Both?” Economics and Philosophy 21
½2005: 199–220; and Matthew Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis ½Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, chap. 5Þ. If we assume that life with the com-
plete disability is below the threshold and that the harm of being bedridden for a day would
occur to people who are above the threshold, then this view accounts for the aforemen-
tioned judgments in cases 1 and 2. However, this view is open to the following objection. On
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it.7 However, we require of a moral principle not merely that it accom-
modates firmly held case judgments but also that it offers a plausible
68 Ethics October 2014rationale for these judgments. In what follows, I offer such a rationale. I
then appeal to this rationale to defend ARC against several objections.
II
What follows is a thumbnail sketch of the proposed rationale for ARC.8
There are two conflicting ways of responding to the equal objective
moral value of each individual’s well-being. One of these is aggregative
and the other nonaggregative. Both of these ways rightfully have a hold
on us. ARC partially accommodates and arbitrates between these ways of
responding to people’s claims in a plausible way.
Let me elaborate. On the aggregative approach, the satisfaction of
an additional person’s claim of a given strength is always just as impor-
tant, no matter how many other people’s claims of that strength are at
issue. It is, for example, just as important to save 1,001 over 1,000 people
from premature death as it is to save 2 over 1 from this fate. On this ap-
proach, then, satisfying N claims of a given strength is N times as im-
portant as satisfying one claim of a given strength. This naturally yields
the judgment that what is most important is that one satisfies the great-
est possible sum of strength-weighted claims. This approach is attractive
because it asserts the unvarying and equal marginal importance of every
additional person’s claim of a given strength.
By contrast, the nonaggregative approach involves imaginatively
placing oneself, one person at a time, in the position of each person who
has a claim and viewing the situation through her eyes. On this ap-
proach, for each individual taken separately, one takes in what she would7. See Brink, “Separateness”; Kamm,Morality, Mortality, vol. 1, chaps. 8–10, and Intricate
Ethics, 297–98 and 484–86; Scanlon,What We Owe, 238–41; and Temkin, “Health Care,” and
Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning ðOxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012Þ.
8. The proposal draws inspiration from Thomas Nagel, “Equality,” in his Mortal Ques-
tions ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979Þ, 106–27, and Equality and Partiality
ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 1991Þ; and Kamm,Morality, Mortality, vol. 1, chaps. 8–10.
the threshold view, an arbitrarily small gain for a person below the threshold can outweigh
any gain above the threshold, no matter how large it is and no matter how many people
would receive it. Brown and Adler rightly regard this as implausible. ARC is not vulnerable to
this objection. ARC holds that a very small potential benefit to a badly off person gives rise to
a weak claim. Because this claim is weak, the competing claim of someone above the pur-
ported threshold to a large benefit will be strong enough to be relevant. On ARC, you ought
therefore to give a large benefit to each of a large number of people who are above the
threshold rather than give a very small benefit to a single person below the threshold, when
you cannot do both. ðFor objections to other nonstandard views, see Fleurbaey, Tungodden,
and Vallentyne, “On the Possibility.”Þ
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have to give up if another person’s competing claim were satisfied. Af-
ter one has performed this imaginative exercise for all individuals, one
Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 69at a time, one does not aggregate their claims. Instead, one takes an
objective perspective on the importance of each claim taken separately.
When one does so, it will appear most important to satisfy the strongest
claim.9 Moreover, if one instead were to satisfy a different claim, then the
larger the gap in strength between the strongest claim and this satisfied
claim, the more one would depart from what is most important, on this
approach.
This approach appears to be rooted in one element of our moral
psychology, namely, sympathetic identification. Adam Smith famously
argued that the process of placing oneself in another’s shoes is the cen-
tral moral impulse.10 I am making the more modest proposal that it lies
at the heart of a nonaggregative approach to distributive ethics. It seems
to me a crucial fact that this form of sympathy is essentially nonaggre-
gative. I can sympathetically imagine myself in one person’s position, but
I cannot imagine myself in the position of a collection of individuals,
except by imagining myself in the position of a single ðperhaps repre-
sentativeÞ member of the collective or by imagining myself in each of
their positions one at a time. Psychological research suggests that, as a
consequence, moral reasoning that relies solely on this process of sympa-
thetic identification will not account for numbers.11 Of course, the mere
fact that this approach draws on a psychologically real form of moral
concern does not show that the approach is right. Its justification is that
this form of concern for each person taken alone is a natural expression
of our appreciation of the separateness of persons. The supreme impor-
tance of satisfying the largest claim can therefore be seen as an expression
of respect for this separateness.12
9. The strongest claim is not necessarily had by the person who is worst off. Rather, as
defined above, the strength of a person’s claim is a function both of how much a person
could gain in well-being and how badly off he would be without this gain. The decision rule
that best captures what is most important from this perspective is therefore not maximin
but rather satisfy the largest claim. See also T. M. Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitari-
anism,” in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams ðCambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press, 1982Þ, 103–28, 122–23; and Sophia Reibetanz, “Contractualism
and Aggregation,” Ethics 108 ð1998Þ: 296–311.
10. See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie
ðIndianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982Þ.
11. See, e.g., Tehila Kogut and Ilana Ritov, “The ‘Identified Victim’ Effect: An Iden-
tified Group, or Just a Single Individual?” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 18 ð2005Þ:
157–67. It is therefore no accident that this process of placing oneself in each person’s
shoes and taking in what is at stake for each, considered separately, lies at the heart of John
Taurek’s nonaggregative distributive morality. See his “Should the Numbers Count?” Philos-
ophy and Public Affairs 6 ð1977Þ: 293–316.
12. See Nagel, “Equality,” and Equality and Partiality, 65–69; Scanlon, What We Owe,
238–41; and Temkin, Rethinking, 100.
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ARC embodies one way of partially accommodating and arbitrating
between these aggregative and nonaggregative approaches. It tells you to
70 Ethics October 2014do what is best on the aggregative approach under the constraint that this
does not depart too far from what is most important on the nonaggrega-
tive approach. It thus takes the form of maximization under a constraint:
it maximizes the sum of strength-weighted claims that are satisfied under
the constraint that these claims are relevant. The demand for maximiza-
tion stems from the aggregative approach. The constraint stems from the
nonaggregative approach.
III
The foregoing is a first step toward a rationale for ARC. We should now
ask: Why should one accommodate the nonaggregative approach by
adopting the “relevance” constraint? This question can also be put as fol-
lows. Imagine a situation in which unrestricted aggregation would favor
saving a number of people with weaker claims rather than one person
with a competing stronger claim. In this situation, the “gap” between, on
one side, the strongest claim and, on the other side, the strength of each
of the weaker claims that would be satisfied if we followed the aggrega-
tive approach is a measure of the departure from what is most important
on the nonaggregative approach. Why should there be a point at which
this measure crosses a morally crucial boundary, giving rise to a “veto” of
the nonaggregative approach over the aggregative approach? And what
determines this point? As Gabriel Wollner puts it, before the view can be
accepted, we must have an “independently plausible and principled rea-
son why ½and where the veto should apply.”13 I now propose an answer
to these questions that draws on a fuller characterization of what is in-
volved in taking up the perspective of each person within the terms set
by the nonaggregative approach.
From the first-person perspective, we typically are much more con-
cerned for our own well-being than for the well-being of strangers. As
Frances Kamm writes of a case in which two individuals ðwho are strang-
ers to each otherÞ have competing claims to be saved from imminent
death, “for each, from his subjective view, his not surviving will be almost
as if ½neither survives.”14 Nonetheless, for most of us, even from our per-
sonal perspective, the well-being of strangers is of concern; the value of
their well-being is visible and can motivate us from the personal point
of view, albeit that it does not have the importance to us that it has from13. Gabriel Wollner, “Egalitarianism, Numbers, and the Dreaded Conclusion,” Ethical
Perspectives 19 ð2012Þ: 399–416, 409.
14. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, 1:154.
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.205 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 09:59:13 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
an objective point of view. From our personal perspective, the death of
a stranger may matter little, but it matters some.
Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 71There are, of course, individuals who care little about their own
well-being. There are also those whose dedication to the well-being of
strangers is so complete that, even from their personal point of view, their
own well-being has no special significance. Furthermore, there are peo-
ple who care nothing for the well-being of strangers. But the pattern of
relative concern outlined applies to most well-socialized and psycholog-
ically normal individuals.
Up to a point, commonsense morality regards as permissible such
greater self-concern. In circumstances in which no other moral con-
siderations apart from one’s own well-being and the well-being of a
stranger are at issue ðe.g., one has no special obligations and would not
violate anyone’s rights by acting on one’s greater concern for oneself Þ, it
also regards it as morally permissible to act on it. This is clear in cases
of the following kind. You and a stranger each face a distinct threat of
harm. These threats are not due to human agency ðthey are, say, posed
by naturally occurring diseasesÞ. The stranger is powerless to avert either
threat, but using only your own resources, you can either save yourself
from harm or save the stranger from the harm he faces ðyou cannot save
both yourself andhim;moreover, noone else can save youor the strangerÞ.
In such cases, commonsensemorality judges it permissible to save yourself
rather than a stranger from an equally large harm. It also regards it as per-
missible to save yourself from a lesser harm rather than a stranger from a
somewhat greater harm. For example, if you can either save yourself from
the aforementioned complete disablement or save a stranger from death,
then you are permitted to prevent your disablement. But there are limits
to the extra concern for your dear self that everyday morality permits. If
you face a very minor harm ðsuch as an illness that will leave you bedrid-
den for a dayÞ and can either prevent this harm to yourself or prevent the
death of a stranger, then it holds that you must save the stranger.
Of course, it is a matter of dispute whether commonsense morality’s
judgments in such cases are defensible or whether, instead, morality al-
ways requires perfectly equal, impartial concern.15 In this article, I simply
assume that, up to a limit, one is indeed morally permitted to be more
concerned for oneself than for a stranger and to act on this pattern of
concern when no other moral considerations ðsuch as rights or special
tiesÞ stand in the way.
I refer to the point of view that results from taking on a person’s
maximally permissible degree of self-concern and minimally required
15. For key contributions to thedebate, see ShellyKagan,The Limits ofMorality ðOxford:
Oxford University Press, 1991Þ; Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism ðOxford:
Clarendon, 1994Þ; and Kamm,Morality, Mortality, vol. 2, chap. 8, and Intricate Ethics, chap. 1.
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other-concern as “the permissible personal perspective.”16 We can draw
on this notion to add to our characterization of the nonaggregative, sym-
72 Ethics October 2014pathetic approach. On this augmented sympathetic approach, when
one imaginatively places oneself in the shoes of a person whose well-
being is at stake, one takes up his permissible personal perspective, from
which his claim looms larger than it does from a purely objective per-
spective. According to the scale of values that one adopts when one takes
on his permissible personal perspective, in a one-to-one comparison of
this person’s claim vis-a`-vis the competing claim of a stranger, the satis-
faction of the former takes on extra significance. The satisfaction of his
claim will therefore take priority over the satisfaction of an equally strong
competing claim of a stranger. The same will be true in some cases in
which his claim is weaker than a stranger’s claim. Nonetheless, it is also
true that if he has a very weak claim and a stranger has a very strong
competing claim, then from his permissible personal perspective, he will
give priority to the stranger’s claim.
We can draw on this idea to formulate the following criterion for
when a claim is relevant. Person A’s claim is relevant to B’s competing
claim just in case, in a one-to-one comparison of their claims from A’s
permissible personal perspective, A’s claim is at least as important as B’s.
Or, to put this test in terms of permissible action: A’s claim is relevant to
B’s competing claim just in case, in a situation in which A must choose
whether to satisfy his claim or B’s claim and in which no morally rele-
vant factors apart from the minimally required concern for B stand in
the way of A’s acting on his self-interest, he would be permitted to satisfy
his own claim.
By way of illustration, consider again case 1, in which there is one
young man with a claim to be saved from premature death and there are
a number of people with competing claims to be saved from complete
disablement. The proposed test for whether the latter’s claims are rel-
evant is this. Imagine that you could either save yourself from complete
disablement or save a stranger from death and that, in making this de-
cision, you need consider only your own well-being and that of the
stranger. Would it be permissible to save yourself? Plausibly, the answer
is yes. If so, then the claim to be saved from complete disablement is
relevant to the claim to be saved from a terminal illness.
Next consider case 2, in which there is one young man with a claim
to be saved from death and there are a number of people with com-
peting claims to be spared being bedridden for a day. Imagine that you
could either spare yourself from the latter very minor harm or save a
16. This is close to what Kamm,Morality, Mortality, vol. 1, chap. 8, refers to as the “ob-
jectively permissible subjective perspective.”
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stranger from death and that, in making this decision, you need con-
sider only your own well-being and that of the stranger. Would it be
Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 73permissible to spare yourself ? Plausibly, the answer is no. If this answer
is correct, then the claim to be saved from this very minor harm is not
relevant to the young man’s claim.
Why should this test determine the ðirÞrelevance of a claim? The
answer has several parts. First, this test embodies the key elements of
the nonaggregative, sympathetic approach. The nonaggregative element
is captured by considering claims one to one. The sympathetic element is
captured by taking on each person’s maximally permissible degree of self-
concern ðandminimally required degree of other-concernÞ. Of course, as
noted above, this pattern of concern may differ from the person’s actual
degree of self-concern. But this idealization is warranted. Suppose, first,
that A2 assigns greater importance to his well-being compared to the well-
being of a stranger than is morally permissible—say, he would save him-
self from a very minor harm rather than save a stranger from an early
death. It would be improper for this outsized self-concern to lead to A2’s
claim being judged relevant.17 Suppose, next, that A1 has more than the
minimally required degree of altruism. This fact alone should not lead
us to judge a claim of his irrelevant when he could permissibly give his
claim priority over a stranger’s competing claim. Imagine that both A and
A1 each have claims of equal strength ðthey both stand to lose the same
amount of well-being from the same levelÞ and that each of their claims
competes with B’s stronger claim. Suppose further that A has precisely
the maximally permissible degree of self-concern and the minimally re-
quired degree of other-concern. Finally, imagine that from A’s personal
perspective, his claim has priority over B’s in a one-to-one comparison, so
that his claim is relevant, but that from A1’s more altruistic personal per-
spective, B’s claim has priority. It would be implausible to maintain that
A’s claim is relevant and A1’s claim is irrelevant. The claims of people
who are more altruistic than morality requires do not thereby alone di-
minish in moral significance.18
17. The notion of sympathy used here is therefore normative: when one imagines
oneself in another’s position, one does not take on his actual self-concern. Rather, one
takes on the concern he would maximally be permitted to have. In this, I follow Smith, who
makes clear that when placing oneself in another’s shoes, one does not adopt all his pref-
erences and feelings but rather those that an idealized spectator could sympathize with—
those that are proper. For example, on self-interest, he writes: “If ½a man would act so as that
the impartial spectator would enter into the principles of his conduct, . . . he must . . .
humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring it down to something which other men can
go along with” ðTheory of Moral Sentiments, II.II.II; see also I.I.III–IVÞ.
18. Of course, the situation may change if A communicates that he does not want to
be aided. I leave aside the role of individuals’ wishes of this kind.
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The second reason for employing this criterion for ðirÞrelevance is
that it tracks an important result of the process of imaginatively taking
74 Ethics October 2014up each person’s permissible personal perspective within the terms set
by the nonaggregative approach. When one does so in case 2, a form of
unanimity emerges. From the permissible personal perspective of some-
one with the very weak claim, the satisfaction of the competing very
strong claim will take priority over the satisfaction of her own claim ðwhen
these claims are compared one to oneÞ. The same will be true from the
perspective of every other person with the very weak claim. Naturally, the
personwith the very strong claimwill agree. Fromhis personal perspective,
his claim to be saved from death takes priority over a stranger’s claim to be
saved from a very minor harm. The process of imaginative sympathy—the
process of judging the situation from each person’s permissible subjec-
tive perspective—will therefore yield agreement between all concerned.
From every person’s perspective, in a one-to-one comparison of the two
competing claims, the strongest claim ought to take priority.
In case 1, by contrast, there is no such unanimity. The process of
imaginative sympathy yields conflict between, on one side, every person
with a claim to be saved from the complete disability and, on the other
side, the single person with a claim to be saved from death. Now, it re-
mains true that when the observer has finished his “round” of identify-
ing with the perspective of each, the nonaggregative approach will judge
it most important to help the one facing death. Nonetheless, the differ-
ence between case 1 and case 2 marks a crucial change in what emerges
from the nonaggregative approach. In case 1, the process leads one to
sympathize with each person’s desire to press his claim. Moreover, af-
ter going through this process, one can see that there is no solution
that does full justice to the personal perspective of each. By contrast, in
case 2, the process yields the conclusion that there is no claim that an
individual will, from his permissible personal perspective, place into com-
petition with the young man’s claim to be saved from death. There is
therefore a solution that is acceptable—indeed, demanded—from the
permissible personal perspective of each.
The third reason to adopt this test of relevance is that, within the
terms of the nonaggregative approach, it allows for a powerful expla-
nation to a person whose claim is judged irrelevant. For one cannot com-
plain that one’s claim is not satisfied by an impartial third party when
it would not even fall within one’s personal prerogative to satisfy it one-
self if no moral considerations apart from the minimally required con-
cern for the stranger’s well-being stood in one’s way.
We can now answer the question posed at the start of this section:
Why should the nonaggregative approach be accommodated in the
form of a constraint on the kinds of claims one can aggregate? The an-This content downloaded from 158.143.197.205 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 09:59:13 AM
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swer is this. The nonaggregative approach requires one to take up each
person’s permissible subjective perspective. From this perspective, one’s
Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 75own weaker claim may take priority over a stranger’s competing stron-
ger claim. But if one’s claim is sufficiently weak, then the stronger claim
will take priority. The point at which this happens has special signifi-
cance. ARC treats this point as a boundary between relevant and irrel-
evant claims. When the nonaggregative approach yields unanimity, it
holds that this unanimity ought to be respected. When, by contrast, this
approach yields disagreement from each person’s perspective, then ARC
resolves this discord by an appeal to the aggregative approach.
This idea seems to fit with at least some people’s everyday moral
sensibility. On a number of occasions on which I have discussed cases
involving a choice between either saving one young person from death
or preventing a very minor harm to a multitude of others ðwho would
have good lives in any caseÞ, an interlocutor has responded, unprompted
and before being presented with the preceding analysis, along the fol-
lowing lines. “It would be wrong to allow the claim of the one to be saved
from death to be outcompeted by any number of claims to be rid of the
very minor harm, because given the difference in what is at stake for
each person, someone facing the very minor harm should withdraw her
claim if she is aware of the situation.”19 This thought is a rough approx-
imation of the deep rationale I have here proposed for ARC. In the re-
mainder of this article, I consider a number of objections to this view.
IV
The first of these is due to John Broome. It runs as follows.20 A key part of
ARC’s appeal is that, unlike leading alternative principles of distributive
ethics, it can accommodate the intuitive judgment in case 2 that one
ought to cure one young person’s terminal illness rather than save any
number of otherwise well-off individuals from a very minor harm. How-
ever, this intuitive judgment is not reliable because it ranges over all
numbers, no matter how big, and we cannot have an intuitive grasp of
every number.
Contra Broome, the preceding discussion establishes that the in-
tuition in question need not rely on a grasp of every number. All that is
required is an intuitive appreciation of the following reasoning. The
gap between what is at stake for one individual who has a very weak claim
and another individual who has a very strong claim may be so large that,
19. Those who responded in this way include an audiencemember at a Philosophy for
All lecture and Kai Spiekermann.20. Broome, “Comment,” andWeighing Lives, 56–58. Parfit, “Justifiability,” 385, raises a
similar objection.
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in a one-to-one comparison, from the permissible personal perspective
of a person with the very weak claim, it is more important that the
76 Ethics October 2014stronger claim be satisfied. When this is the case, the person with the
very weak claim is “silenced”—his claim must not play a role in deter-
mining whether the very weak claims or the competing very strong
claim should be satisfied. What is true of one person with a very weak
claim is true of every other such person. Therefore, for determining
what one ought to do, it doesn’t matter how many people with such
claims there are—no matter how large their number, one ought to sat-
isfy the very strong claim. None of the premises in this reasoning re-
lies on our intuitive grasp of the significance of large numbers. Our in-
ability to intuitively apprehend such numbers is therefore irrelevant to
the case for ARC.
V
I now turn to an objection raised by Derek Parfit.21 It starts from the
following series of choices ðin each case, the choice is made from a
feasible set of precisely two alternativesÞ.
iÞ Suppose that you can either cure one person of an illness that
will kill him while young or, instead, cure a hundred thousand2
this oof a moderate lifelong mobility impairment. Also assume that,
on ARC, the claim to be cured of the moderate impairment is
relevant to the claim to be cured of the terminal illness, so that
we should aggregate the claims of the hundred thousand to be
cured of the former. If, as we can suppose, the sum of these
hundred thousand claims is larger than the single competing
claim to be cured of the terminal illness, it follows that, on ARC,
you ought to cure the moderate impairment of the hundred
thousand rather than the terminal illness of the one.
iiÞ Now suppose that you can either cure a hundred thousand
people of the moderate impairment or cure a billion of a very
slightmobility impairment. Suppose also that the latter’s claims
are relevant to, and together outcompete, the former. It fol-
lows that, on ARC, you ought to cure the very minor impair-
ment rather than the moderate impairment.
iiiÞ Finally, assume that, onARC, theclaimsof thebillion tobecured
of the very slight impairment are irrelevant when competing
with the claim of the one to be cured of the illness that will
strike him down in his youth. You therefore ought to cure the
1. Parfit, “Justifiability,” 384. I thank an anonymous referee for pressingme to discuss
bjection.
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one’s terminal illness rather than save the billion from the very
slight impairment.
Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 77Parfit then asks: What, according to ACR, ought you to choose when
have three feasible alternatives: save the one from death, save theyou
hundred thousand from the moderate impairment, or save the billion
from the very slight impairment? ðYou can do only one of these things.Þ
Using the aforementioned judgments from sets of two feasible alterna-
tives, Parfit concludes that, on this view, from this feasible set of three
alternatives you ought to save the hundred thousand from the moderate
impairment rather than the one from death, you ought to save the bil-
lion from the very slight impairment rather than the hundred thousand
from the moderate impairment, and you ought to save the one from
death rather than the billion from the very slight impairment. He con-
cludes that, “on this view, ½you could not avoid acting wrongly. Whatever
½you do, ½you ought to have done something else instead.” Parfit adds
that “in cases of this kind, that is an unacceptable conclusion.”22
To answer this objection, we need to consider how the reasoning
employed in choosing from these feasible sets of two alternatives applies
to a choice from this set of three alternatives. By hypothesis, from the
permissible personal perspective of someone with the claim to be cured
of the very slight impairment, her cure does not take priority over cur-
ing a stranger of the terminal illness. Of course, the same will be true
from the perspective of the person with the terminal illness. But, unlike
in a choice between only two alternatives, we must also consider the per-
spective of another interested party: someone facing the moderate im-
pairment. From her perspective, both the claim to be cured of the very
slight impairment and the claim to be cured of the terminal illness be-
long to strangers. For her, these two claims therefore retain the relative
significance they have from an objective point of view. Someone facing
the moderate impairment will therefore also judge that, in a one-to-one
comparison, one stranger’s terminal illness ought to take priority over
another stranger’s very slight impairment. Within the terms of the non-
aggregative approach, we therefore find the following agreement from
the perspective of each: curing the terminal illness ought to take prior-
ity over curing the very slight impairment. ARC respects this unani-
mous judgment by ruling that the very slight impairment is irrelevant.
The remaining eligible alternatives are to cure the terminal illness or the
moderate impairment. Since the latter is judged relevant to the former
ðbecause it can permissibly be pressed from the perspective of the per-
son with the moderate impairmentÞ, this principle requires the choice of
whichever of these alternatives satisfies the greatest sum of strength-
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weighted claims. By assumption, curing a hundred thousand people of
the moderate impairment does this. ARC therefore mandates curing
78 Ethics October 2014them.
It is straightforward to extend this reasoning to cases involving fea-
sible sets with even more alternatives. From each feasible set, one sim-
ply assesses whether a claim is relevant by comparing it, one to one and
from the permissible personal perspective of each, to the strongest com-
peting claim in that set. A claim is irrelevant if and only if this strongest
competing claim takes priority over it from every person’s perspective.
One then chooses an alternative that satisfies the greatest sumof strength-
weighted, relevant claims.
VI
Our answer to the preceding objection shows that ARC always selects at
least one alternative from a feasible set. But it may prompt a new objec-
tion: that ARC violates the following basic principle of rational choice.23
Basic Contraction Consistency: If an alternative is permissibly chosen
from a given feasible set, then it is also permissibly chosen from any
To a
ment
2
terna
and S
Econo
2subset containing that alternative.24
ssess whether this condition is indeed violated by ARC, it is useful
to use some shorthand. Let “death” stand for curing one from death,
“moderate” stand for curing a hundred thousand of the moderate im-
pairment, and “very slight,” for curing a billion of the very slight im-
pairment. Given the discussion in the preceding section, it then appears
that ARC mandates the following Basic Contraction Consistency–vio-
lating choices: from the feasible set fdeath, moderate, very slightg,
choose moderate, and from the set fmoderate, very slightg, choose
very slight.
In response, it is important to note that ARC offers a coherent ex-
planation of this pattern of choices.25 When one must choose from the
set fmoderate, very slightg, then the claims to the cure of the very
slight impairment are relevant. By contrast, when one must choose from
the set fdeath, moderate, very slightg, then, on ARC, the claims to
be free from the very slight impairment are not relevant. The distinction
23. This objection is found in Temkin, “Health Care,” and Rethinking ; Broome, “Com-
”; and Wollner, “Egalitarianism.”
4. This condition is also known under the name “Independence of Irrelevant Al-
tives,” or “Alpha.” For a discussion of this condition, see Amartya Sen, Collective Choice
ocial Welfare ðSan Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970Þ, and “Internal Consistency of Choice,”
metrica 61 ð1993Þ: 495–521.
5. Compare Kamm, Intricate Ethics, 484–87.
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.205 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 09:59:13 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
that ARC draws between “choosing very slight from fmoderate, very
slightg” and “choosing very slight from fdeath, moderate, very
Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 79slightg” is not ad hoc. Rather, it follows from the fact that, on this view,
the relevance of a weaker claim depends on whether, from the permis-
sible personal perspective of someone with the weaker claim, one gives
this claim priority over the strongest competing claim in a one-to-one
comparison. It therefore tracks the presence or absence of the type of
unanimity from each person’s permissible perspective that ARC regards
as crucially important. Since this pattern of choices tracks ARC’s ratio-
nale, it would be wrong to regard it as irrational in the sense in which
this term is used in rational choice theory, that is, “not rationalizable by a
coherent set of values.”
Ought one then to reject Basic Contraction Consistency as a nec-
essary condition for rational choice? Some think so.26 By contrast, I favor
an approach outlined by Broome.27 Basic Contraction Consistency is an
internal consistency condition—it must be satisfied if choices are to be
explicable in terms of values that guide choice. When we judge whether
it is violated by a moral view, we must therefore ensure that we iden-
tify alternatives by characteristics which that view takes to be pertinent
grounds for choice. In other words, we must take one alternative to be
identical to another if and only if it has, on the view in question, the
same pertinent characteristics. Now, if we individuate alternatives in
line with what, according to ARC, are their morally pertinent charac-
teristics, we should therefore distinguish “very slight when chosen
from fmoderate, very slightg” and “very slight when chosen from
fdeath, moderate, very slightg.” We can do so by using the super-
script “r” to denote an alternative with relevant claims and “:r” to de-
note an alternative without relevant claims. Properly individuated, the fea-
sible sets and choices mandated by ARC are therefore as follows. From
fdeathr, moderater, very slight:rg, choose moderater, and from
fmoderater, very slightrg choose very slightr. Since the latter set
is not a subset of the former, these choices do not violate Basic Con-
traction Consistency.28
VII
I now address the following fundamental objection to my discussion of
ARC. This principle merely reproduces, in an elaborate way, a set of
26. Fleurbaey, Tungodden, and Vallentyne, “On the Possibility,” 283–84, rehearse the
arguments for rejecting Basic Contraction Consistency.
27. See John Broome, Weighing Goods ðOxford: Blackwell, 1991Þ, chap. 5.
28. For criticism of this “fine-grained individuation” approach, see Temkin, Rethink-
ing, 465. For a response to this criticism, see my “Vaulting Intuition: Temkin’s Critique of
Transitivity,” Economics and Philosophy 29 ð2013Þ: 409–25.
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preexisting common judgments about when aggregation is required and
when it is ruled out. ARC and its proposed rationale therefore do not
80 Ethics October 2014offer anything new, nor do they do real work in justifying these judg-
ments.29
The reply has several parts. First, one thing that is novel is the
proposed connection between the answers to two questions that are
typically discussed separately, namely, How much priority can one per-
missibly give oneself over a stranger? and Which claims aggregate? The
proposed connection is controversial and testable. It is controversial
because leading thinkers disagree. John Taurek, for example, holds both
that one can permissibly prioritize oneself over others and that claims
never aggregate.30 And Parfit holds both that morality permits giving
priority to oneself and that it requires aggregation of even comparatively
very small claims.31 It is also testable, since we have independent pur-
chase on the correct answers to these questions. Consider, first, our judg-
ments about the extent to which we are permitted to prioritize ourselves
over strangers in situations of the kind outlined above. Of course, nei-
ther commonsense morality nor the moral theories that endorse such a
personal prerogative precisely delineate the extent of this prerogative.32
Nonetheless, there are, in everyday ethics, cases in which it is clearly true
that the balance of one’s interest and the interest of the stranger is such
that one may favor oneself. Furthermore, there are cases in a “borderline
zone,” in which it is unclear whether it is permissible to favor oneself but
in which a moderate shift in the balance of interests would yield a more
definite verdict. There are also cases in which this configuration is such
that one must clearly aid the stranger. If the proposed version of ARC is
correct, then these will correspond, respectively, to the following cases:
cases in which aggregation is intuitively required, borderline cases for
aggregation, and cases in which aggregation is intuitively prohibited.
In the harms involved in case 1, we already have an example in which
it is intuitively clear that one is permitted to save oneself from a lesser
harm rather than a stranger from a greater harm and in which the lesser
harm should be aggregated. In the harms involved in case 2, we have
an example in which it is clear that one is not permitted to save oneself
from the lesser harm rather than a stranger from the greater harm and
29. This objection was put to me by an anonymous referee.
30. Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?” 301 and 306–7.
31. On permissible priority for oneself, see Derek Parfit, On What Matters ðOxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011Þ, vol. 1, esp. sec. 59; on aggregation, see Parfit, “Justifiability,”
384–85.
32. See Taurek, “Should the Numbers Count?” 301 and 306–7; Scheffler, Rejection;
Nagel, Equality and Partiality, chaps. 2 and 4; and Kamm, Morality, Mortality, vol. 2, chap. 8,
none of which precisely specifies the boundaries of the prerogative. Parfit,OnWhat Matters,
vol. 1, esp. chap. 6 and sec. 59, argues that these boundaries are irremediably imprecise.
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in which, intuitively, the lesser harm should not be aggregated. A further
key test is therefore to consider a borderline case. What follows seems to
Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 81me such a case.
Suppose that you are a young adult and that a finger of yours has
just been severed in an accident ðfor which no one is to blameÞ. Its loss
will modestly hinder your everyday activities and be somewhat disfigur-
ing, but in other respects, you will have a good life. Using your own
resources, you can have it successfully reattached, or you can instead
save a stranger’s life. This seems to me a borderline case for the personal
prerogative. It is unclear whether it is permissible to save yourself from
this disfigurement. Moreover, if your loss were moderately greater ðsev-
eral fingers, sayÞ it would be quite clear that you could permissibly save
yourself, whereas if it were moderately smaller ða mere part of a fingerÞ it
would appear that you ought to save the stranger.
Now consider the following case.
Case 3. You, a morally motivated stranger, can either cure one
young man’s terminal illness or prevent a number of people ðwho,
This
wheoverall, will lead good lives in any caseÞ from losing a finger. Is
there a number of people you can spare the latter harm for which
you ought to spare them this harm instead of saving the one from
death?
seems to me to be a borderline case. Intuitively, at least, it is unclear
ther there is a number of people who each face the loss of a singlefinger for which you ought to save that number from this loss rather
than save a single young person’s life. Moreover, if the former harm
were moderately larger ðsay, each person faced the loss of several fin-
gersÞ, then it would seem one should save a very large number from this
harm rather than one from death, whereas if the harm were significantly
smaller ða mere part of a fingerÞ, it would be counterintuitive to judge
that one ought to do so. It therefore seems that ARC passes this test.
I now turn to the second part of the reply to the objection that ARC
offers nothing new. ARC tells us what to do in cases in which we may lack
clear intuitive judgments. One such case is the three-feasible-alternatives
case discussed in Sections V and VI. When you can either save one from
death or a hundred thousand from the moderate impairment or a bil-
lion from a very slight impairment, it is, I submit, difficult to discern in-
tuitively what you ought to do.33 As we saw, ARC tells you to save the
hundred thousand from the moderate impairment, and for a plausible
reason. From the perspective of each person, in a one-to-one compari-
son of competing claims, one ought not to prioritize the very slight im-
33. Compare Wollner, “Egalitarianism,” sec. 3; and Temkin, Rethinking, 45–52.This content downloaded from 158.143.197.205 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 09:59:13 AM
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pairment over death. Within the terms of the nonaggregative approach,
curing the very slight impairment is therefore unanimously judged in-
82 Ethics October 2014eligible. ARC therefore rules out curing the very slight impairment.
Among the remaining alternatives, curing the moderate impairment sat-
isfies the greatest sum of strength-weighted, relevant claims, and so ought
to be chosen. Indeed, ARC selects at least one alternative from every set
of alternatives. The collection of cases in which it tells us what to do
therefore presumably includes many cases in which we do not have clear
pretheoretical judgments.
The final part of the response is this. The relevant intuitive judg-
ments in cases 1 and 2 stand in need of justification. The rationale I
have proposed “does real work” in providing this justification because it
shows that these judgments reflect important values. It also plays a
crucial role in replying to objections, as we have seen in Sections IV–VI.
Against Broome’s ostensibly powerful debunking explanation of non-
aggregative intuitions, I invoked ARC’s rationale to offer a vindicatory
explanation of these intuitions. This rationale also helped explain why
ARC can always choose at least one alternative from a feasible set and
why it does not violate principles of rational choice. In the next section, I
appeal to this rationale to rebut a final objection.
VIII
Consider the following case, which is a variation of a case formulated by
Parfit.34
Case 4. Nine hundred young adults have contracted a disease. Be-
fore being affected, they all had life prospects equal to 1 on a car-
3dinal well-being scale, where 1 is a full life in good health and 0 is
death at a young age. The disease will affect them differentially: if
untreated, person One will experience a very slight loss in lifetime
well-being ðand so still lead a good lifeÞ, person Two will experience
a slightly greater loss, and so on, in a linear fashion through to
person Nine Hundred, who will end up with a very large loss and will
lead a life only barely worth living. Fortunately, you have nine
hundred doses of a medicine that can be consumed in either a one-
dose form or a superdose form which uses up all nine hundred
doses ðno other dosages are possibleÞ. A single dose only slightly
alleviates the disease’s effects. In a person who can tolerate it, the
superdose nearly completely eliminates its effects. Only Nine Hun-
dred can tolerate the superdose. This means you have the following
options.4. Parfit, “Justifiability,” 383 n. 16. See also Temkin, Rethinking, 440–45.
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Everyone one dose. On the aforementioned scale of well-being,
One experiences a decline of 1/1,000, Two of 2/1,000, and so on,
The
Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 83until Nine Hundred, who suffers a loss of 900/1,000.
Nine Hundred the superdose. Nine Hundred has a decline of
only 1/1,000, One has a decline of 2/1,000, Two a decline of 3/
1,000, and so on, until Eight Hundred Ninety-Nine, who has a
decline of 900/1,000.
distributions of losses for these options are listed in table 1.
In this case, since each individual’s well-being outcome is just 1
minus his loss, Everyone one dose leads to an anonymized distribution
of well-being that is identical to the anonymized distribution of well-
being under Nine Hundred the superdose. Put differently, the well-
being associated with the worst anonymized position under Everyone
one dose is identical to the well-being associated with the worst posi-
tion under Nine Hundred the superdose and correspondingly for the
well-being associated with every other position. All standard views of dis-
tributive ethics, from leximin through to utilitarianism, will therefore
hold that these alternatives are equally good and that it is thus permissi-
ble to choose either one.
By contrast, it is plausible that ARC will demand that you give Nine
Hundred the superdose. Because so much is at stake for Nine Hundred
and he would be so badly off without it, he has a very strong claim to
this dose. The largest of the competing claims is held by Eight Hundred
Ninety-Nine. We can assume that even though she would be very badly
off if she remained untreated, the small improvement in her well-being
provided by a single dose means that her claim to that dose is too weak to
be relevant to Nine Hundred’s competing claim. All other claims to a
single dose will therefore also be irrelevant, so that ARC will mandate
treating Nine Hundred with the superdose.
In this case, Parfit agrees with standard distributive views that both
courses of action are equally good and therefore both are permissible.
He therefore sees this case as providing a counterexample to ARC.35
However, contrary to Parfit, it seems that in case 4, only ARC arrives
at the right conclusion. Consider what hangs on your choice for each
person involved, taken separately. For Nine Hundred, what is at stake is
the difference between a good life and a life barely worth living. By con-
trast, for every other person, all that depends on your choice is a mar-
ginal improvement in his or her quality of life. By assumption, this im-
provement is so small that none of them would be permitted to secure
it for themselves alone rather than secure the larger improvement for
35. Parfit, “Justifiability,” 383 n. 16.This content downloaded from 158.143.197.205 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 09:59:13 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Nine Hundred. Moreover, when you step back and take an impersonal
view, it is clear that the value of these small potential improvements to
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF LOSSES OF WELL-BEING IN CASE 4
Individual
Everyone
one dose
Nine Hundred
the superdose
One 1/1,000 2/1,000
Two 2/1,000 3/1,000
Three 3/1,000 4/1,000
. . . . . . . . .
Eight Hundred Ninety-Nine 899/1,000 900/1,000
Nine Hundred 900/1,000 1/1,000
84 Ethics October 2014everyone except NineHundred is, in the aggregate, precisely equal to the
value of the potential improvement in Nine Hundred’s well-being. In
sum, in this case, giving Nine Hundred the superdose is the only alter-
native that does justice to the perspective of each person taken separately,
and it does so at no cost in terms of impersonal value. Rather than pre-
senting an objection to ARC, case 4 therefore reveals its advantages over
familiar alternative views.36
However, Parfit also presents a case like what follows, which is more
challenging for ARC.
Case 5. This case is just like case 4, except that if you give Nine
Hundred the superdose, everyone’s decline is very slightly greater
Thethan in case 4, as follows.
Nine Hundred the superdose*: Nine Hundred has a decline of
2/1,000, One has a decline of 3/1,000, Two a decline of 4/1,000,
and so on, until Eight Hundred Ninety-Nine, who has a decline
of 901/1,000.
distributions of losses for these options are listed in table 2.
In case 5, giving everyone one dose unquestionably leads to a betteranonymized distribution of well-being: under this alternative, the well-
being associated with the worst position is greater than the well-being
associated with the worst position if you instead provide Nine Hundred
with the superdose and, correspondingly, for the well-being associated
with every other position. Giving everyone one dose is therefore better on
36. Here, I am agreeing with Temkin, Rethinking, 440ff.This content downloaded from 158.143.197.205 on Tue, 30 Sep 2014 09:59:13 AM
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every standard measure of the goodness of distributions of well-being,
from leximin through to utilitarianism.
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF LOSSES OF WELL-BEING IN CASE 5
Individual
Everyone
one dose
Nine Hundred
the superdose*
One 1/1,000 3/1,000
Two 2/1,000 4/1,000
Three 3/1,000 5/1,000
. . . . . . . . .
Eight Hundred Ninety-Nine 899/1,000 901/1,000
Nine Hundred 900/1,000 2/1,000
Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 85How will ARC require you to choose? Because so much is at stake
for Nine Hundred and he would be so badly off without it, he still has a
very strong claim to this dose. As before, the largest of the competing
claims is held by Eight Hundred Ninety-Nine. Her claim to one dose is
stronger than it was in case 4 because this dose would do her more good.
Nonetheless, because the improvement you can secure for her remains
so small, her claim to a single dose is still very weak in comparison to
Nine Hundred’s claim. Indeed, given how much is at stake for Nine Hun-
dred, we can assume Eight Hundred Ninety-Nine’s claim is too weak to be
relevant to Nine Hundred’s competing claim. All other claims to a single
dose will therefore also be irrelevant, so that ARC will mandate treating
Nine Hundred with the superdose.
Parfit regards this implication as unacceptable.37 In his view, it is
wrong to allow Nine Hundred’s claim to trump everyone else’s compet-
ing claims to receive aid, when satisfying his claim will unambiguously
worsen the anonymized distribution of final well-being and lead an-
other ði.e., Eight Hundred Ninety-NineÞ to end up even worse off than
Nine Hundred would be if everyone were given a single dose.
Case 5 highlights that ARC may mandate choices that have costs in
terms of the impersonal goodness of the distribution of well-being. Parfit
is right that this counts against ARC. However, as we saw in case 4, the
well-being attached to each position in the distribution of well-being is
not the only thing of importance. What is at stake for each person and
how this compares to what is at stake for another with a competing claim
is also important. In case 5, it remains true that Nine Hundred is the only
person to whom you can make a large difference—the difference be-
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tween a full, good life and a life barely worth living. If you forgo making
this great difference to Nine Hundred’s life, then all you can do is mar-
86 Ethics October 2014ginally improve the lives of a multitude of others. This provides a rea-
son to give Nine Hundred the superdose because that would best respect
what matters most when we take up each person’s position separately
and compare her claim to the strongest competing claim. The question
is, then, whether it is reasonable to sacrifice some impersonal goodness
of the distribution of well-being in order to do justice to the nonaggre-
gative approach. If I have characterized this approach correctly, it both
is deeply rooted in our moral psychology and reflects a form of respect
for the separateness of persons. I therefore believe it is indeed reason-
able to accept some loss of impersonal goodness for its sake. Of course,
this sacrifice should not be too great. Fortunately, ARC limits the sac-
rifice of impersonal value it will demand in cases of this kind. To see
why, imagine a choice between Everyone one dose and a new alterna-
tive, Nine Hundred the superdose**, and progressively magnify the
decline in the well-being attached to every anonymized position associ-
ated with the latter. As this decline grows larger, individuals’ claims to a
single dose grow stronger and become relevant. When enough of these
smaller claims become relevant, they will together outcompete NineHun-
dred’s claim. ARC will then require the impersonally best alternative.38
In sum, Parfit’s purported counterexamples are not decisive. In-
deed, case 4 supports ARC. And case 5 merely reveals that we face a dif-
ficult choice. We can either do what every standard conception of the
goodness of distributions says is best or have the nonaggregative, sym-
pathetic approach play a central role in our moral deliberations by giv-
ing special significance to the claims of those who have much more at
stake than others. When faced with this dilemma, I have argued that it is
reasonable to sacrifice some impersonal goodness to do justice to the
nonaggregative approach.
IX
Many believe both that we ought to save a large number from being
permanently bedridden rather than save one from death and that we
38. As mentioned in the introduction, I have so far focused on cases in which the
claims to an alternative are either all relevant or all irrelevant. The scenario I am here
imagining, however, would involve some claims to an alternative ðe.g., Eight Hundred
Ninety-Nine’s claim to Everyone one doseÞ becoming relevant before others’ claims to
that very same alternative reach the threshold of relevance defined by the test given in the
main text. For such cases, the test I have offered may need adjustment—so that when,
say, Eight Hundred Ninety-Nine’s claim to Everyone one dose becomes relevant, other,
weaker claims to that alternative also become relevant. For discussion of such cases, see
Frances Kamm, “Aggregation and Two Moral Methods,” Utilitas 17 ð2005Þ: 1–23.
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ought to save one from death rather than save a multitude of people
ðwho would be well off in any caseÞ from very minor harms, no matter
Voorhoeve How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims? 87how large this multitude. I have argued that these judgments reflect
two conflicting responses, one aggregative and one nonaggregative, to
the equal objective value of each person’s well-being. I have also argued
that ARC partially accommodates and arbitrates between these responses
in a reasonable way. This principle holds that a person’s weaker claim is
irrelevant in the face of another’s stronger competing claim just in case,
in a one-to-one comparison of these claims, the stronger claim ought to
take priority from every person’s point of view. It thereby respects a form
of unanimity that emerges from the nonaggregative approach. In the
absence of such unanimity, this principle requires that we resolve con-
flicts of interest as the aggregative approach demands, by satisfying the
greatest sum of strength-weighted claims.
I have argued that leading objections to this view are without force,
with the following exception. ARC’s accommodation of the nonaggre-
gative approach is costly: in some cases, it mandates the selection of an
alternative that worsens every anonymized position, from the worst to
the best position, in a distribution of well-being. Such cases therefore
reveal a way in which we may be forced to choose between pursuing what
is impersonally best and giving a special role to the claim of a person
who has much more at stake than anyone else. This choice is not an easy
one. However, it seems reasonable to sacrifice some impersonal good-
ness in order to do justice to how things look when we take up each per-
son’s point of view, one person at a time, and see how what is at stake
for him or her compares to what is at stake for someone with a compet-
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